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The mind-body problem is one of the great mysteries. How are my fee-
lings and thoughts related to the nerve cells of my brain? This question 
not only concerns scientists and philosophers, but everyone… for your 
consciousness seems very much bound up with who you are. In his book 
Consciousness Explained Daniel C. Dennett defends his grand theory of 
consciousness. It is an extraordinary book, in virtue alone of being read by 
both philosophers and the general audience. In this book Dennett presents 
us his Multiple Drafts model of consciousness.  The Multiple Drafts model 
is an explanation of how our consciousness works. However, Dennett not 
only wishes to sketch the mechanisms of our consciousness, he also wants 
to show new ways of thinking about resolutions to the traditional myster-
ies of consciousness. This entails a critique on, according to Dennett, the 
mainstream view of the nature of consciousness; a view he calls Carte-
sian materialism. Cartesian materialism holds the assumption that there is 
some sort of ‘stage’ to which experiences present themselves to a ‘mind’s 
eye’, an internal viewer. Dennett calls this ‘stage’ the Cartesian Theater. He 
vehemently rejects this notion of consciousness as a Theater, for he thinks 
that this notion is illusionary and does not give us a correct picture of 
consciousness.   
When I discuss consciousness in this paper, I mainly talk about visual 
consciousness, namely the awareness and appearance of an external world 
through vision, following Dennett who introduces his model through a 
discussion of the visual system and keeps his discussion mainly limited to 
perceptual consciousness.
In this paper, I argue that Dennett does not provide us with an expla-
nation of consciousness. His model is based on a wrong characterization 
of our phenomenology and as a consequence he has to rely on the mysteri-
ous notion of probe in order to ‘explain’ phenomenal experience. Before I 
discuss Dennett’s Multiple Drafts theory, I first identify the position Den-
nett argues against: Cartesian materialism. Afterwards I will give a short 
note on his methodology. Then the Multiple Drafts model will be intro-
duced through the Phi Phenomena. Subsequently, I shall look further into 
phenomenal consciousness itself. Two questions arise concerning Den-
nett’s Multiple Drafts theory: (1) How exactly is the content of our visual 
system created? And, (2) how do we form a unified, coherent conscious 
experience? Dennett has the problem that he cannot provide a satisfactory 
solution to these two questions. Both questions will be discussed in turn 
after which I conclude.
§2 Cartesian materialism
According to Descartes human beings are composed of a material body 
and an immaterial soul. Although the body and the mind can interact with 
each other, they are fundamentally different substances. The first being the 
res extensa, with its primary attribute extension, and the latter being the res 
cogitans, the thinking substance. The fact that we, human beings, are made 
up of these two substances separates us from the animals that only possess 
a body, not a mind. Animals only operate on mechanical notions whereas 
humans have free will. According to Descartes, the interaction between 
these two substances has to take place in the human body. Stimuli from 
the senses have to reach the mind and the (immaterial) mind must have 
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control over the (physical) body, otherwise humans cannot move about in 
this world. Descartes pinpointed this place of interaction between mind 
and body in the pineal gland, an organ that sits in the midline of our brain 
and is attached to the rest of our nervous system. It is here, according to 
Descartes, that mechanical input from the body is translated to the mind 
and input from the mind translated into mechanical action. This is the 
theory of Cartesian Dualism.
  Yet locating the place of interaction between mind and body did 
not help Descartes in solving one of the major problems of this theory: 
how do mind and body interact? Somehow the states of mind and body 
must be brought into relation; but if the mind is unextended and the body 
extended, how can this interaction take place? Placing the interaction in 
the pineal gland offers no clarification of this mysterious interaction.
 Another consequence of Cartesian Dualism – besides the above 
mentioned troublesome relation between two substances – is that the the-
ory assigns a center to the brain, a central place in the brain that integrates 
all conscious experience. All traffic from the senses has to pass through 
the pineal gland. Thus it is the pineal gland that houses consciousness. 
Although there are not many proponents of Cartesian Dualism nowadays, 
the idea of a centralized gateway or functional center is still present in many 
theories of consciousness. Dennett calls “the idea of such a centered locus 
in the brain Cartesian materialism, since it is the view you arrive at when 
you discard Descartes’ dualism but fail to discard the imagery of a central 
(but material) Theater where ‘it all comes together.’” (Dennett, 1991, p. 
107) What enters this part of the brain is what you are conscious of. The 
Cartesian Theater is a metaphor for how consciousness sits in the brain. 
That is, the brain builds up a unified picture, a representation, which is 
‘viewed’ by a central entity in order to become experience. Dennett admits 
that most likely no one today explicitly endorses Cartesian materialism, 
but he argues that the imagery of the Cartesian Theater is persuasive and 
“keeps coming back to haunt us.” (Dennett, 1991, p. 107)
 But positing such a place of central processing can in the end lead to 
faulty analysis. Those who subscribe to a Cartesian Theater (whether explic-
itly or implicitly) can give an explanation of some cognitive ability or process 
by providing a functionalist analysis, but rely on an internal agent to ‘tie 
the knots together.’1 So any loose end which cannot be explained by the 
functionalist2 analysis is being attributed to this point of central processing. 
This point of central processing ends up having the cognitive abilities that 
needed explanation in the first place. According to the Cartesian materialist 
consciousness can only be understood by a Theater and an audience, because 
that which is being projected in the Theater must be viewed by an audience. 
This audience functions like an internal observer, the homunculus. Only 
what ends up being projected in the Theater can be conscious. If conscious-
ness can only be understood via a Theater, we can also only understand the 
observer through the metaphor of a Theater. So the Theater and its audience 
need another Theater and audience in the head of the audience in order to 
be understood, leading to an infinite regress of Theaters.
 One of Dennett’s aims is to get rid of this notion of a centralized 
place of processing in the brain in order to escape Cartesian materialism. 
For him, there is no single brain area in which it all comes together. With 
this decentralized notion of consciousness, there is no need for a Theater 
and no need for a homunculus to live inside our brains. Dennett’s Multiple 
Drafts model of consciousness must first be understood as an alternative 
for Cartesian materialism.
§3 Side-note on methodology
One of the reasons the false notion of the Cartesian Theater came into 
existence, was that people made the mistake of ‘naively looking inward’. 
Dennett denies that people have immediate epistemic access to their con-
scious states. People can be mistaken about their own mental states. He 
rejects introspectionism – the idea that we have privileged access to our 
own thoughts and feelings and this access is somehow immune to errors 
(Dennett, 1991, p. 67). Descartes privileged his own thoughts with his 
‘Cogito ergo sum’ and gave us the Cartesian Theater in the pineal gland. 
The phenomenologists adopted Descartes’ first-person perspective, “in 
which I describe in a monologue (which I let you overhear) what I find 
in my conscious experience, counting on us to agree.” (Dennett, 1991, p. 
70)3  On the basis of reflection on our own experiences, we can come to 
know what our conscious states are like.
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 According to Dennett, first-person methods of introspection 
have no privileged position over third-person methods. In fact, Dennett 
proposes a third-person perspective when it comes to studying our con-
sciousness and inner world. He calls this perspective heterophenomenology, 
which stands in contrast to the earlier mentioned introspective pheno-
menology. Where Husserl bracketed the outer world, Dennett brackets the 
inner world. Husserl wanted to neutralize his metaphysical and empiri-
cal commitments and Dennett wants to neutralize his commitments to 
the ontological status of mental states. A third-person perspective cannot 
describe the inner world, so the heterophenomenologist assumes an agnos-
tic attitude towards the ontological status of mental states. He studies not 
these mental states, but the behavior and beliefs subjects have about their 
inner world. Reports from subjects on their conscious experience are just 
further bits of evidence about the inner world. The heterophenomenolo-
gist, who wants to study consciousness, distrusts the first-person accounts 
that people give about their own qualitative experiences; he sees those 
accounts as idiosyncratic, unreliable and plagued with inconsistencies. The 
heterophenomenologist fictionalizes the reports of the first-person con-
scious experiences of subjects. The reports are seen as abstractions that 
describe the complex cognitive state of a subject. Dennett suggests that 
we should interpret the reports of first-person conscious experiences in 
the same way we interpret works of fiction. These reports should be read 
as novels. Subjects receive instructions from experimenters and give verbal 
feedbacks, which are all later converted to transcripts and studied by the 
heterophenomenologist. These heterophenomenologist texts are construed 
as a world of theorist’s fiction (Wah, 2007). For the introspectionist the pri-
mary data are the experiences, for the heterophenomenologist the primary 
data are the utterances and behavior of the subjects they research. Hetero-
phenomenology aims to be a scientific method to study consciousness. 
The heterophenomenologist does not suppose that the phenomenological 
accounts people give, have to be shared amongst all.
 Although Dennett’s skepticism about naïve introspectionism is 
justified, he may be too quick in dismissing first-person accounts. Accor-
ding to O’Regan & Noë, Dennett wrongly characterizes how things seem 
to perceivers (2001, p. 965). For instance, Dennett criticizes the notion 
that the visual field is in sharp detail and uniform focus from the center 
to the periphery. But according to O’Regan & Noë, normal perceivers 
are not aware of their visual fields in this way. They take the world to be 
solid, dense, detailed, and present. This wrong characterization is the result 
of Dennett reducing all first-person approaches towards consciousness to 
naïve introspectionism. O’Regan & Noë propose, instead of naïve intro-
spectionism, an approach consisting in an “attentiveness to the complexity 
of the activity of perceptual exploration” (2001, p. 965). This approach 
would allow talk about the facts of our experience at a personal level.  It 
would be possible to formulate substantive empirical questions on the 
first-person qualitative experiences.
§4 The Phi Phenomenon
Before Dennett discusses his model, he introduces the reader to the optical 
illusion called the Phi Phenomenon. Take two stationary dots separated by 
four degrees of visual angle. When these spots are lid in rapid succession, 
it seems there is a single spot moving between two points. When we give 
these spots different colors, say red and green, another interesting thing 
happens: the ‘moving’ spot appears to change color midway. This illusion 
is also persistent. Even armed with the knowledge of the Phi Phenomenon, 
you cannot help seeing the moving spot and the moving spot changing 
color. This is an odd thing, for how can the first spot seem to change color 
before the second spot is observed? The green spot cannot be attributed as 
content to any event until the light from the green spot has reached our 
eyes and triggered a neural response. 
 Dennett gives us two possible explanations, which he will both 
discard in favor of his own Multiple Drafts model of consciousness (1991, 
pp. 116-117). The first explanation is the Orwellian revision and contains 
a revision of memory. The second explanation is the Stalinesque revision 
and is a perceptual revision. In the first explanation, shortly after the sec-
ond spot has entered consciousness, the mind makes up a narrative about 
the intervening events. It is this new event which enters memory. In the 
second explanation there is a delay in the brains editing room. The first 
spot is held in preconsciousness until the second spot arrives. In the edit-
ing room intermediate content is created and the finished (illusionary) 
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product arrives at consciousness. According to Dennett, there is no pos-
sible reason to choose one explanation over the other. There is no way to 
demarcate the place and time in the brain where something enters con-
sciousness (Dennett, 1991, p. 126).
 According to Dennett, both the Stalinesque and the Orwellian 
revision fall away in the Multiple Drafts model, because there is no finish 
line anymore where everything has to be presented. There is no distinct 
moment of phenomenal awareness anymore. He claims that there is no 
real difference between both explanations. Both explanations still pre-
suppose a Cartesian Theater, because both explanations assume a fixed 
point in the process where content becomes conscious. Dennett’s Multiple 
Drafts model replaces the notion of a Cartesian Theater by parallel, multi-
track processes of interpretation and elaboration. All information entering 
the nervous system is under continued revision (Dennett, 1991, p. 111). 
There is no center; instead the perspective of the observer is smeared out 
in time and space. The structure of the mind is not like the structure of a 
computer with a CPU, but more akin to the model of a Pandemonium. 
The Pandemonium architecture was developed by Oliver Selfridge. 
The Pandemonium is a pattern recognition system that consists of four 
layers, each layer comprising units called demons who ‘scream’ for atten-
tion. The first layer records the sensory input. The second layer consists 
of feature detector demons, which detect certain features. For instance, 
one demon detects a horizontal straight line and another detects a curved 
line. The cognitive demons in the third layer are sensitive to these detected 
features. Each cognitive demon recognizes a certain pattern. The ‘screa-
ming’ of a cognitive demon is determined by how much of their pattern is 
detected by the feature detector demons. Finally there is a decision demon 
that hears the shouting of the layers below and decides what pattern was 
presented in the layer below. The Pandemonium itself is far too simple to 
be a model of the mind, but Dennett is interested in the parallel nature of 
the Pandemonium and the absence of centralized processing (Schneider, 
2007).
Neuroanatomical and neurophysiological research shows that the 
visual system in the human brain is only loosely hierarchical and func-
tionally more interactive. Visual stimuli, such as the two dots in the Phi 
Phenomenon, may initially flow serially through the lowest level of the vis-
ual system, but then quickly reach modules on multiple levels (where more 
specific features are detected). A module is a specialized local section of the 
brain that detects certain features. These modules simultaneously process 
information about one and the same stimulus (Akins, 1996). This is what 
Dennett refers to as parallel, multi-track processes.  Each module infers the 
presence of certain properties and the processing of visual stimuli gradually 
yield discriminations of greater and greater specificity. Perceptual modules 
carry out content discrimination, content fixation or feature detection, 
and cognitive sites make decisions or judgments or perform processes of 
interpretation and elaboration (Dennett, 1991, p. 134-135). Parts of the 
brain (modules) go into states that discriminate certain features. First there 
is the mere onset of stimulus, then location is discriminated, then shape, 
then color. Later (apparent) motion is discriminated and eventually object 
recognition takes place. Each module determines a certain feature of the 
world by ordinary computational means. At any moment there are multi-
ple narrative fragments, or ‘drafts’, which are in various stages of editing. 
Some or all of these ‘drafts’ converge to gene-rate intentional behavior of 
the organism. The lesson Dennett takes from the Phi Phenomenon is that 
if one wants to settle on some moment of processing in the brain as the 
moment of consciousness, that moment is always arbitrary. 
Modules that make decisions or judgments still seem to imply a 
homuncular theory of consciousness. Because persons make decisions and 
judgments, not parts of the brain. According to Dennett we must not 
understand decisions and judgment in the case of (perceptual) modules in 
the full sense that we understand decisions and judgments when it comes 
to persons. When it comes to the modules, ‘decisions’ and ‘judgments’ are 
metaphors for how a module determines a certain feature of the world. 
Dennett wants to replace the metaphors of the Cartesian Theater with new 
metaphors and he does not claim to replace the metaphor of the Cartesian 
Theater with a nonmetaphorical theory (Dennett, 1991, p. 455). The sin-
gle-minded agent is to be broken down “into miniagents and microagents 
(with no single boss)” (Dennett, 1991, p. 458). In the following sections 
of this paper I address the success of Dennett’s new army of metaphors in 
escaping the fallacies of the Cartesian Theater.
34
Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy Thijs Heijmeskamp | Dennett’s Drafters
§5 When does consciousness arise?
According to the Multiple Drafts model, perception is accomplished in 
the brain by parallel, multi-track processes of interpretation and elabo-
ration of sensory inputs. But when consciousness exactly arises, has 
not been discussed yet. The first problem for Dennett’s theory is due 
to the decentralized nature of the Multiple Drafts theory: it presumes 
that the visual system processes different properties of stimuli at differ-
ent sites and at different speeds. How then, is it possible that we have 
a coherent and unified experience of the world? This problem has both 
a spatial aspect and a temporal aspect. Spatial in the sense, as we have 
seen, that if properties of stimuli are being processed at different spatial 
sites, it is not clear how everything is brought together in a spatially 
unified whole. Temporally in the sense that since a modular conclu-
sion4 about a single event will be produced across a period of time and 
will be inter-mixed with other conclusions about earlier and subse-
quent events (Akins, 1996). This is known in the philosophy of mind 
as the problem of binding: how do various features of a visual scene 
come together in a unified experience? The process of discriminating 
content for our visual experience is not unified. So how does a single 
unified experience follow from a disunified process? There appears to 
be a gap between modular content discriminations and our personal 
experiences. 
 However, Dennett does not see the problem of binding as a real 
problem, for it presupposes Cartesian materialism. The problem assumes 
that the spatial unity of a perceptual experience must be mimicked by the 
spatial unity of the representations. Representations of temporally uni-
fied objects and events must occur in the same sequence as those objects 
and events. The assumption is that the phenomenological properties of 
our experience must match the physical properties of the neural vehicles 
(Akins, 1996). Dennett claims that representations of single, spatially 
unified objects need not themselves be spatially unified or singular. It is 
through symbolic representation that the brain differentiates the order 
in which ‘conclusions’ (Dennett’s term) are produced. We perceive an 
ordered world of objects and events, because those temporal relations are 
symbolically represented by the brain. It is not the disunity of content 
discriminations that poses a problem for perceptual experience. It is only 
the disunity of content that provides a problem for understanding the 
form of our perceptual experience.
 Thus Dennett puts aside the problem of binding, for there is no 
more need for physically unified representations. The problem that remains 
however is the problem of the unification of representational content. The 
pandemonium-like model of the brain leaves the brain with many distri-
buted contentful states and modular conclusions. Some of these states die 
out and leave no further trace. Others leave trace on subsequent verbal 
reports of experience and memory. As soon as content discrimination has 
been accomplished, it becomes available for eliciting some behavior. Con-
tent arises, gets revised, contributes to the interpretation of other content 
or to the modulation of behavior, and yields over the course of time some-
thing like a narrative stream. At any moment in time there are multiple 
drafts of narrative fragments at various stages of editing in various places in 
the brain. It is through the notion of probing that Dennett wants to solve 
the problem of the unification of content. Probing is a process in which 
a consistent narrative thread is selected from among many of the states 
described (Dennett, 1991, pp. 134-135). Probing the narrative stream at 
different intervals will produce different effects and thus produce different 
versions of what occurred. Probes do not happen at regular fixed intervals, 
but are initiated sometimes by a need for action or sometimes by a self-
imposed question. It is not necessary that probes give a full account of the 
events. The task of a probe is to unify information required to perform the 
task or solve the problem at hand. Probes arise irregularly in response to 
internal or external puzzles and initiate the integration of select subsets of 
information. 
 It is important to note that probing the narrative stream is a 
process of selection, not rewriting, re-ordering, translating or trans-
porting the information to a central place so that the events can be 
played in a Cartesian Theater. Any narrative that gets precipitated pro-
vides a ‘time line’, a subjected sequence of events from the point of 
view of an observer. It is the answer to the probes that makes up our 
phenomenological consciousness. Probes are the bridge between the 
sub-personal system, where there are only content discriminations, and 
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our psychological phenomenal experience, where we have an experi-
ence of an objective coherent world. If probes were absent, we would 
not be conscious of a narrative, since the answers to the probe form a 
part of a subject’s experience. According to Kathleen Atkins (1988) the 
view that “probes are both necessary and sufficient for conscious expe-
rience” can be attributed to Dennett.5 Without the probe there is no 
consciousness. 
But, the question remains: when does consciousness exactly arise? 
Does consciousness arise during the binding of representational content 
or only after the probe is completed? If consciousness arises during the 
binding, at which stage of the process does it arise? Surely binding takes 
time. There seems to be neither a method for answering this question 
nor any evidence. The binding process is not available to the subject; we 
are not aware of it. We have no access to the temporal relations among 
the representational vehicles themselves and the individual conclusions 
that are reached, nor do we have access to the order in which indepen-
dent representational contents are unified. Phenomenological accounts, 
first-person or third-person, are of no help because our experience is 
that of an orderly world. We are only aware of the results of the process, 
not the process itself. We see events in the external world, not the bin-
ding processes. Although the impossibility to know when consciousness 
exactly arises poses no problem for Dennett,6 it does point to the mys-
terious nature of the probe and the essential role it plays in establishing 
conscious experience. More importantly, it remains unclear how the 
binding process works. How exactly does the probe unify the content of 
our representations? It is clear, however, that probing does not create a 
new representation. Our conscious experience is not the representation 
of the multitude of representations created by the perceptual modules. 
The content of our conscious experience is mirrored by their underlying 
neural representations. Once a feature detection or discrimination has 
been made by a specialized module in the brain, the information con-
tent is fixed and need not be rediscriminated by a central discriminator.
§6 Dennett’s black boxes
When we return to the color Phi Phenomenon, both the Orwellian (revision 
of memory) and the Stalinesque (perceptual revision) explanation fall short, 
because on a small time scale there is no more distinction between a revision 
of perceptual input and a revision of memory. The brain does not build up 
a single final representation of the world; there is no final draft and canon-
ical narrative that a researcher may or may not access. What happens is that 
the brain creates content, a perceptual module makes a judgment, and this 
content is available to govern activity and/or leave its mark on memory. Judg-
ments made by perceptual modules only have to be made once. In the case of 
the Phi Phenomenon the content that is created is the motion between the 
dots. This means that the sensory input (the stimuli) does not equal percep-
tion. The world as we experience it is a grand illusion. Not in the traditional 
sense that we are given much less than we see, so what we think we see must 
arise through the workings of our brain. But in a new skeptic sense, that we 
do not have the experience we think we have; we are radically deceived by 
our brains about what our experience is (Noë, 2009, pp. 200-201). All of our 
sensory input goes through a process of interpretation and elaboration.
 So perception is a parallel, distributed, erratic and non-linear pro-
cess with no central locus. This means that it is possible (and very likely) 
there will be simultaneous information processing of signals carrying 
information from sequential stimuli. At each stop in the process there are 
individual perceptual modules, which carry out ‘content discriminations’, 
‘content fixations’ or ‘feature detections’, or non-perceptual or cognitive 
sites which arrive at ‘decisions’ or ‘judgments’, or perform ‘processes of 
interpretation and elaboration’. It is these modules together that form 
something like a narrative stream. 
One of the problems is that we do not know what happens inside 
the modules. For instance, how a module carries out shape recognition 
remains a mystery. From a retinal image the brain must extract different 
kinds of information of the visual scene. Which criteria do the modules 
use to determine which details of the sensory information are salient or 
not? Dennett does not leave us with an explanation of how the content of 
our visual system is created. How is it determined what judgments must 
be formed by modules, and what to edit out or what content to fill in 
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(for instance, the motion and color change in the Phi Phenomenon)? In 
other words, when do the modules ascribe meaningful content and on 
what basis? We can imagine that simple feature detection modules carry 
out some basic form of shape recognition, but how do more complicated 
cognitive modules or discrimination modules create content? Where do 
the rules come from upon which they ‘act’? For now, these modules are 
like ‘black boxes’ for us; we do not know what they look like on the inside.
Dennett’s model of the mind seems to be somewhat detached from the 
world, i.e. the world is only there to provide sensory stimuli and the rela-
tion between perception and visual stimuli is merely inferential. It is the 
visual system that creates content from the sensory stimuli. The criteria for 
determining the creation and selection of content can only be provided by 
the brain itself. Criteria are necessary, because there must be a correspon-
dence between the specific stimulus and the created content, because if 
this relation were arbitrary, the visual system would not work. Positing that 
the modules themselves establish these criteria, is in itself not an answer 
for it still does not answer on what basis these criteria are established. The 
point is: instead of positing a single homunculus, Dennett posits multiple 
homunculi. Although these homunculi have simpler abilities and powers 
than the Cartesian homunculus, they carry little explanatory power. The 
(perceptual) modules still remain a mystery.
§7 Perceptual unity and the self
The modular make up of our visual system can leave us, especially in the short 
run, with multiple and contradictory conclusions. The only demand that can 
be laid upon such a system (or better said the system forces upon itself ) is 
the demand for consistency. Because the world is consistent, our experience 
of the world must also be consistent. So multiple contradictory conclusions 
cannot coexist in the long run, and consistency checks can identify these 
inconsistencies. It is the role of probes to perform these consistency checks. 
Our conscious experience is a unification of selected parallel and dis-
tributed processes. When these processes are probed they form different 
narratives, which in turn are continuously revised and updated. It is how-
ever unclear how these narratives are chosen. If consciousness is merely the 
result of edited visual data, there seems to be a need for an editor. Since 
there is no homunculus, no central place of processing, it is up to the visual 
modules and the probes to create a coherent unified conscious experience. 
This implies that the probes need more demands than the demand for 
coherence in order to select a coherent narrative or to adjust narratives in 
order to make them coherent. Some data have to be left out of conscious 
experience and this editing out has to be communicated between different 
modules in order to form narratives. These probes somehow interact with 
the content of modules from (in this case) the visual system, somehow 
combine some content of different modules and elect to ignore other con-
tent in cooperation with other probes, while the constructed narrative is 
under continuous revision. Dennett’s probes provide us with an even big-
ger mystery than his modules. Not only do we not know how these probes 
work (how they interact with the perceptual modules), but we also do not 
know what elicits a probe.
When it comes to consciousness, as we have seen, it is the probes that 
do the heavy lifting. Consciousness arises when the stream of narratives is 
being probed. But why must the perceptual content be unified as a visual 
experience? The question why experience is needed in addition to all the 
computational processes is not addressed by the theory. In other words: what 
drives the process of the unification of our conscious experience? With the 
absence of a homunculus, the core of our identity, Dennett speaks of the 
‘self ’ as the center of narrative gravity (Dennett, 1991, p. 418). The self is 
not the source, but the result of the different narratives that are spun by ‘us’; 
it is a metaphorical point where all aspects of our identity converge. This 
also means that our notion of ‘me’ can change and is different over the years. 
The self is formed by the unified narratives and cannot be the driving force 
behind the unification of our conscious experience. It seems that the probes 
are endowed with the cognitive powers Dennett want to explain.
§8 Conclusion
Dennett rejects all homuncular theories of consciousness and gives us a 
decentralized account of consciousness. O’Regan & Noë pointed out that 
Dennett is too quick in dismissing first-person accounts of our conscious 
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experiences with his method of heterophenomenology. This leads him to 
a fundamentally wrong characterization of our consciousness and forces 
the problem on himself of explaining why our conscious experience is illu-
sionary. Dennett starts out with the critique that it is a false assumption 
that our visual field is sharp in detail and uniform in focus from the center 
to the periphery. This leaves Dennett with a problem that follows him 
throughout his theory in that he has to account for the fact that normal 
perceivers have this false assumption. But normal perceivers do not take 
themselves as to experience all the environmental details at once. We see 
ourselves as situated in an environment.
According to the Multiple Drafts model, perception is accomplished 
in the brain by parallel, multi-track processes of interpretation and elabora-
tion of sensory inputs. These content discriminations produce something 
like a narrative stream. Probing this stream at different places and times 
produces different effects and precipitates different narratives. There are 
many small agents screaming for attention. What we experience is a prod-
uct of many processes of interpretation. Frustratingly, Dennett has very 
little to say about how these content discriminations work and it is unclear 
what governs the modules. Since the relation between these modules and 
the world is only inferential, there seems to be a need for a programmer.
Although our first-person account of consciousness says, according to 
Dennett, very little, about how our consciousness really arises Dennett still 
faces the problem of accounting for this unified experience. However, the 
probes seem to have the cognitive powers that Dennett tries to explain with 
his theory, thus falling into the same trap as the Cartesian materialists. The 
problem with the homunculus fallacy is that it attributes the whole mind 
to part of the system, thus offering no explanation at all. If Dennett’s meta-
phorical model of the mind is to be successful in replacing the metaphor of 
the Theater, it needs to provide elucidation where homuncular theories do 
not. Dennett’s metaphors must be more productive in explaining conscious-
ness in unconscious terms in order for it to be a successful theory.7 Even if we 
grant Dennett his point that his model of consciousness is merely intended 
as a metaphorical model - we are not forced to assign judgments in the strong 
sense to (perceptual) modules, like we do to persons - he needs to demon-
strate that his metaphors are better tools for understanding consciousness. 
But these new tools seem to share certain faults with the metaphors used 
by Cartesian materialists. Although Dennett breaks up the homunculus 
into smaller homunculi, they maintain much of the mystery. Ultimately, 
Dennett does not provide us with an explanation why the changing of red 
to green in the Phi Phenomenon is conscious at all. In fact, Dennett does 
not appear to need consciousness at all for his model of the mind. In Den-
nett’s functionalist explanation of visual perception it remains unclear why 
we have conscious experience or need conscious experience. The unifica-
tion of the multiple drafts through probing is not a conscious experience 
(we don’t have access to the probes) and we only experience its results con-
sciously. Consciousness, understood this way, seems to be a mere side-effect 
of probes. Dennett’s metaphors speak very little of consciousness. 
Although the Multiple Drafts model aims to give an explanation of 
how our consciousness works, the model still relies on mysterious parts, in 
this case the probes, to account for conscious experience. Dennett fails to 
give an explanation on how a coherent conscious experience is established 
from the parallel multitrack processes. He successfully escapes the problem 
of binding, but cannot count for the unification of content in the brain. It 
seems that the Multiple Drafts theory requires a drafter. 
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank prof. dr. F.A. Muller and Tjeerd Visser for comments 
on a earlier version, and the anonymous editors of the ESJP for helping me 
improve this paper even further.
Thijs Heijmeskamp (1988) obtained his BA in Philosophy at the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam. He is currently enrolled in the MA Philosophy program. His main research 
interests are in the areas of philosophy of mind and metaethics.
‘Dennett’s Drafters’ was written for the master’s course ‘Consciousness From All Sides’ 
taught by prof. dr. F.A. Muller.
38
Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy Thijs Heijmeskamp | Dennett’s Drafters
Editorial note
Since  this  essay  was  written  by  a  member  of  the  editorial  board 
of the Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy, it was subject to a more 
extensive  review  procedure.  For  more  information,  see  http://www.
eur.nl/fw/english/esjp/submissions.
Notes
1. For example, according to Cartesian materialism, we build up an internal representation 
corresponding to what we experience. The data for vision are to be found on the retinas. 
Some scientists abide to the principle of Cartesian materialism and take the problem of 
the inverted retinal image seriously. The retina is the inner coat of the eye which is light 
sensitive. Because light passes through the lens of the eye, the image is inverted. According 
to some scientists, the brain has to adjust for this inversion (Noë, 2009, p. 144). But this 
problem is based on the misguided assumption that the ‘image’ projected on the retina, 
is an actual image. Seeing the retinal image as a picture doesn’t explain vision. In order to 
explain vision, scientists still has to explain how the brain ‘sees’ the image on the retina.
2. Functionalism in philosophy of mind holds that a mental state is not defined by its 
internal constitution, but by its function in the system which it is part of.
3. I will not address whether Dennett’s characterisation of the philosophical tradition of 
Phenomenology is correct. I will however address whether Dennett’s own phenomenologi-
cal account of our visual consciousness is correct.
4. Dennett denies that for experience we build up a single unified representation. The expe-
rience of for instance warm coffee comes about through a variety of sensory modules, each 
drawing their own perceptual conclusions. These conclusions from shape modules, color 
modules etc. are not rewritten into a single homogenous representational form.
5. It must be noted that Dennett never explicitly states this view in Consciousness Explained.
6. Dennett claims that no theory of consciousness (which, according to him must be a 
functionalist explanation) would be able to determine the exact moment of consciousness 
(1991, p. 401-404).
7. Assuming that consciousness can ultimately be explained in unconscious terms, which 
Dennett aims to do (Dennett, 1991, p. 454).
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